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STATEMENT OF AMICUS INTEREST1
The Black Lung Clinic (“Clinic”) is a legal clinic
at the Washington and Lee University School of Law
in Lexington, Virginia. The Clinic represents former
coal miners and survivors who are pursuing federal
black lung benefits. The Clinic’s clients are
represented by a member of the law school faculty
licensed to practice law who works closely with
students in the Clinic. Students evaluate claims;
develop evidence; conduct discovery, depositions, and
hearings; and write motions, arguments, and
appellate briefs. In attempting to collect benefits,
miners and survivors face formidable teams of
lawyers, paralegals, and doctors that the coal
companies assemble to challenge these claims. The
Clinic currently represents seventeen former coal
miners and their spouses, with dozens of closed
claims. Nearly seventy of these current and former
clients are receiving benefits as a direct result of the
changes to the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA)
made in the Affordable Care Act.
Section 1556 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA) makes two major
changes to the Black Lung Benefits Act. These

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, no counsel for a
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person
other than amici or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission. All parties
have consented to the filing of this brief.
1

2
changes remove limiting language to make it simpler
for disabled miners and their families to establish
that they are entitled to federal benefits. First,
§ 1556(a) reinstates the fifteen-year rebuttable
presumption, which presumptively entitles former
coal miners to benefits if they have worked over
fifteen years underground and have a totally
disabling pulmonary disease. The second, § 1556(b),
reinstates a continuation of benefits for surviving
spouses whose coal-mining spouse was receiving
benefits at the time of their death. The clients of the
Clinic already have benefitted from these
amendments: nearly sixty former clients who are
currently receiving black lung benefits could face
modification proceedings and the loss of benefits if §
1556 is not severed; clients with pending claims
could face a change in their ability to prove their
claims mid-process, and the ability of future miners
to prove their entitlement to benefits will be injured.
The Clinic has a profound interest in the possibility
of the invalidation of the amendments. If the
amendments are totally struck down it would
adversely affect our clients; not only the ones
currently enjoying benefits under the amendments,
but all coal miners or surviving spouses who will
bring cases in the future.
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ARGUMENT
I.

SEVERABILITY MUST BE
PRESUMED GIVEN THAT § 1556 IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID, CAN
FUNCTION INDEPENDENTLY, AND
IS CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESS’
OBJECTIVES IN ENACTING THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT.

The framework for severability is well
established, asking what “Congress would have
intended in light of the Court’s constitutional
holding . . . .” See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp.
Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932);
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005)
(citing Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 767 (1996)
(“Would Congress still have passed” the valid
sections “had it known” about the constitutional
invalidity of the other portions of the statute?)
(internal quotations omitted). In answering this
question, the Court must “refrain from invalidating
more of the statute than is necessary.” See Booker,
543 U.S. at 258 (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 652 (1984)). The Court “must retain those
portions of the Act that are (1) constitutionally valid,
(2) capable of functioning independently, and (3)
consistent with Congress' basic objectives in
enacting the statute.” See id. at 258-59 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added). The last prong is
concerned with legislative intent and whether
Congress would have preferred an Act severed to no
Act at all. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N.
New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 330 (2006). This
counterfactual question of legislative intent must be
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asked in the present rather than the past; the
relevant question is “not whether the legislature
would [have] prefer[red] (A+B) to B” but “whether
the legislature would prefer not to have B if it could
not have A as well.” See Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S.
137, 143 (1996). And in the absence of evidence that
Congress would prefer no Act at all, the Court must
defer to the legislature. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 509
(2010) (“[N]othing in the statute's text or historical
context makes it 'evident' that Congress . . . would
have preferred no Board at all to a Board whose
members are removable at will.”).
The test therefore embodies a presumption in
favor of preserving as much of the law as possible,
requiring proof of legislative intent contrary to
severability. The Court has also historically noted
the existence of this presumption. Since Marbury v.
Madison, courts have presumed severability,
recognizing that the Court does not have the power
to strike a law that is not constitutionally invalid.
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)
(rendering unenforceable § 13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789 but leaving other sections in effect, since an Act
of the legislature must be repugnant to the
Constitution to be voided by the Court). It is out of
this tradition that this doctrine continues to embody
a presumption in favor of judicial restraint, favoring
severability when possible. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at
328-29; see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 321 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting in part) (discussing the presumption of
severability); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 653
(1984) (“[T]he presumption is in favor of
severability.”). The Supreme Court in Ayotte v.
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Planned Parenthood of North New England
addressed this separation of powers concern
explicitly, stating that: 1) nullifying the legislature’s
work beyond what is necessary “frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people,” 2) the
Court must restrain itself from rewriting law “even
as [it] strive[s] to salvage it,” and 3) the “touchstone
for any decision about remedy is legislative intent,
for a court cannot ‘use its remedial powers to
circumvent the intent of the legislature.’” See Ayotte,
546 U.S. at 328-30.
As a result, a reviewing court must “try to
limit the solution to the problem. . . . sever[ing]
problematic portions while leaving the remainder
intact.” See id. at 328-29; Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S.
at 508 (citing Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472
U.S. 491, 504 (1985) (“[The] normal rule is that
partial, rather than facial, invalidation is the
required course.”).
a) Precedent shows a consistent application
of these principles, finding severing to be
the appropriate remedy.
The Court’s application of this doctrine in
United States v. Booker is instructive. See United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (severing only
two statutory provisions which 1) made the
Sentencing Guidelines mandatory, or 2) depended on
the Guidelines’ mandatory nature).
First, the Court identified that the
constitutional conflict was limited to the Sentencing
Guidelines’ mandatory nature. See id. at 259-60. It
then recognized that the remainder of the Act,
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without the “mandatory” provisions, could function
independently. See id. Accordingly, the Court struck
only the provisions related to the mandatory effect of
the Guidelines, making the Guidelines advisory. See
id. at 246 (“The . . . approach, which we now adopt,
would . . . make the Guidelines system advisory
while maintaining a strong connection . . . to the
increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress
intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”). The
Court cautioned that because of the complexity of
the statute, its “interrelated provisions, and a
constitutional requirement that creates fundamental
change – we cannot . . . determine likely
congressional intent mechanically.” See id. at 248. In
making this determination, the Court found that the
remaining provisions (now advisory in nature) were
still consistent with Congress’ basic sentencing
intent – “to move the sentencing system in the
direction of increased uniformity.” See id. at 253.
It is true that at the time the Act was passed,
Congress clearly intended a mandatory set of
Guidelines, not intending to pass them in an
advisory form. See id. at 293 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Congress explicitly rejected as a model for reform
the various proposals for advisory guidelines that
had been introduced in past Congresses.”). This is
not the correct point of analysis; such an approach
would have the effect of systematically invalidating
any analysis regarding severability. See Leavitt, 518
U.S. at 143-44 (1996) (stating that a determination
that “a legislature bent on banning almost all
abortions would prefer . . . to ban no abortions at all
rather than merely some” was “at the very least,
questionable when considered in isolation.”). Each
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provision of the Guidelines already took on the force
of law, and the perspective must shift; Congress’
intent then becomes a counterfactual question
asking what Congress would intend now, after
learning that mandatory provisions were struck. See
id. at 143. It was with this perspective in Booker
that the Court acted with restraint, refusing to
invalidate Congress’ work in total when the
remaining provisions would add various new
protections furthering its objectives.
This focus on Congress’ holistic purpose in
enacting the law, and the ability of the remaining
provisions to further this purpose, has historically
driven the Court’s analysis. Under this
methodology, the Court has found that
unconstitutional legislative veto provisions did not
interfere with the purpose of the remaining
provisions under the Immigration and Nationality
Act allowing for the suspension of deportation
proceedings in extreme circumstances. See INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 934-35 (1983). A legislative
veto provision also did not interfere with favorable
provisions for the airline industry which were
intended to de-regulate this market. See Alaska
Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 696 (1987). In
both cases, the Court noted Congress’ lack of
discussion of the legislative veto with respect to the
remaining provisions, inferring the unconstitutional
provision’s relative unimportance in these
mechanisms. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 934 (“[T]here
is insufficient evidence that Congress would have
continued to subject itself to the onerous burdens of
private bills had it known that § 244(c)(2) would be
held unconstitutional.”); see also Alaska Airlines, 480
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U.S. at 697 (“In the almost total absence of any
contrary refrain, we cannot conclude that Congress
would have failed to enact the Airline Deregulation
Act . . . if the legislative veto had not been
included.”). Likewise, the Court has also found that
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act remained “fully operative” in
its purpose even if the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board’s unconstitutional, dual layered
removal restrictions, fell. See Free Enter. Fund, 561
U.S. at 509. The Court also refused to invalidate
Congress’ policy of shifting responsibility for
regulating the disposal of radioactive waste to the
States. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
151-52 (1992). In New York v. United States, the
Court identified “three types of incentives [the
legislature had added] to encourage the States to
comply with their statutory obligation to provide for
the disposal of waste generated within their
borders.” Id. at 152. When one of these incentives
(the take title provision) was struck, the Court
reasoned that “[c]ommon sense suggests that where
Congress has enacted a statutory scheme for an
obvious purpose, and where Congress has included a
series of provisions operating as incentives to
achieve that purpose, the invalidation of one of the
incentives should not ordinarily cause Congress'
overall intent to be frustrated.” See id.
Finally, this precedent is consistent with the
Supreme Court’s decision to sever certain Medicaid
expansion provisions of the Affordable Care Act
given their capacity to continue to function in a way
that is “consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in
enacting the statute.” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (citing Booker,
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543 U.S. at 259). Specifically, the remaining
provisions continued to further the purpose of the
Affordable Care Act because “nothing in our opinion
precludes Congress from offering [additional] funds
under the Affordable Care Act to expand the
availability of health care, and requiring that States
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on
their use.” See id. at 585. Where withdrawing
existing funds for Medicaid was unconstitutional,
new funding could still be offered as an incentive
encouraging States to participate in the federal
government’s healthcare initiatives. See id. at 585. It
was not evident that Congress would have wanted to
strike down the rest of the PPACA, “had it known
that the States would have a genuine choice whether
to participate in the new Medicaid expansion.” See
id. at 587. In fact, there was no evidence that
“Congress would have wanted the whole Act to fall,
simply because some [states] may choose not to
participate.” See id. In the absence of evidence that
Congress would have objected to these remaining
provisions, the Court acted with proper restraint by
severing only the plainly defective provisions.
b) Justice Scalia’s dissent in Nat'l Fed'n of
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius does not follow
this precedent.
In his dissent, Justice Scalia recasts the
doctrinal test as following: 1) whether “the
provisions will work as Congress intended” and
2) whether “Congress would have enacted them
standing alone and without the unconstitutional
portion.” See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 692-93 (Scalia, J.
dissenting). However, his understanding of the
second test is flawed. Justice Scalia states that
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“many provisions . . . are ancillary to its central
provisions . . . [or] entirely unrelated – hitched on
because it was a quick way to get them passed
despite opposition, or because their proponents could
exact their enactment as the quid pro quo for their
needed support.” Id. at 705. Although Justice Scalia
concedes that many of the minor provisions can
function independently and as intended without the
unconstitutional provision, he attacks the second
prong. See id. (“Some provisions, such as requiring
chain restaurants to display nutritional content,
appear likely to operate as Congress intended . . . .”).
He argues that “[o]ften, a minor provision will be the
price paid for support of a major provision. So, if the
major provision were unconstitutional, Congress
would not have passed the minor one.” See id. at 704.
This is not the proper question under
traditional severability doctrine. First, this doctrine
of judicial restraint is based on the fact that each
provision did pass into law. See Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129
Harv. L. Rev. 2118, 2148 (2016) (asking how the
Court would know “what . . . the Members of
Congress who voted for the bill, would have wanted?
Is this even the right question to be asking?”). The
reason for the Court’s separation of powers concerns
stems from this acknowledgment. Justice Scalia
construes the purpose of the Affordable Care Act so
narrowly that he must create two unequal classes of
laws: major and minor bargain provisions. See
Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 699 (Scalia, J. dissenting)
(arguing that the purpose of the PPACA was to
provide universal coverage, with all other provisions
limited to balancing costs and benefits in this
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program). This is improper. Additionally, Justice
Scalia fails to follow precedent showing that the
analysis of Congressional intent is not to be
conducted as if from the time of an Act’s passage but
should be a hypothetical analysis of what Congress’
intent would be if faced with the present situation.
See discussion supra Part I. These failings, in
addition to the strong presumption in favor of
severability and lack of contrary evidence of
legislative intent, are conclusive. See id.
These problems flow through to Justice
Scalia’s analogy inquiring whether superfluous
“ornamental” provisions also fall when the Court
cuts down the tree they adorn. See Sebelius, 567 U.S.
at 705 (Scalia, J. dissenting). In actuality, each
“ornament” or minor provision of the Affordable Care
Act is its own separate tree, lawfully passed by
Congress, as one small organism in the forest of laws
enacted under the PPACA. Justice Scalia asks the
wrong question. The proper question is whether the
minor provisions are left standing to support the
PPACA’s purpose even if one of its trees – the
individual mandate – falls.
c) The few cases in which the Court, before
and after Sebelius, refused to sever
maintain a focus on the “domino effect”
of the unconstitutional provision.
Severing is not appropriate when the law
must be substantially overwritten or restructured,
where the provision struck is so central to the
remaining provisions that the legislature would not
have intended them to function on their own. The
presumption of severability also appears weaker
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when the remaining, closely intertwined provisions
establish prohibitions on state and individual rights
rather than Congress’ addition of regulatory
incentives or rights. In Randall v. Sorrell, for
example, the Court struck down a Vermont
campaign finance statute’s limitations on campaign
expenditure and contribution on First Amendment
grounds. 548 U.S. 230, 262 (2006). In its explanation
that the remaining provisions implementing this
prohibition were inseverable, the Court noted that
severing would “require us to write words into the
statute (inflation indexing), or to leave gaping
loopholes (no limits on party contributions), or to
foresee which of many different possible ways the
legislature might respond to the constitutional
objections we have found.” See id. In other words,
the principles of severability (purpose of legislation,
independent function of remaining provisions) in
this case were so frustrated by the constitutional
holding that the remainder of the Act could not be
preserved without putting words into the mouth of
the legislature.
A similar problem occurred in Murphy v.
NCAA. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484
(2018). The Court found that provisions of
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA) prohibiting state licensing and
authorization of sports gambling violated the anticommandeering rule. See id. at 1478. However, the
Court refused to sever these provisions from
PASPA’s separate prohibitions of state-run lotteries
or its prohibitions on private actors sponsoring,
operating, or promoting sports gambling. See id. at
1482-84. The Court first found that “legalizing sports
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gambling in privately owned casinos while
prohibiting state-run sports lotteries would have
seemed exactly backwards” to the larger legislative
scheme Congress intended. See id. at 1483.
Similarly, prohibitions on advertising would not be
appropriate because of the absurd result that
severing would have; forbidding “the advertising of
an activity that is legal under both federal and state
law . . . is something that Congress has rarely done.”
See id. at 1484.
Further, the Court discussed PASPA's
prohibitions against private actors sponsoring,
operating, or promoting sports gambling, stating
that they “were obviously meant to work together
with the provisions in § 3702(1) that impose similar
restrictions on governmental entities . . . we do not
think [Congress] would have wanted the former to
stand alone.” See id. at 1483. Specifically, § 3702(2)
and § 3702(1) were intended as a joint legal
mechanism to sue States for authorizing private
parties in sports gambling schemes in addition to
private parties when they were authorized by States
to engage in this conduct. See id. at 1483-84. Where
“Congress lacks the authority to prohibit a State
from legalizing sports gambling, the prohibition of
private conduct . . . ceases to implement any
coherent federal policy.” Id. at 1483. In Randall and
Murphy, when prohibitions on campaign
contributions and prohibitions on private casinos
fell, the roots of those trees were too closely
intertwined with its surrounding trees.
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II.

APPLICATION OF THIS PRECEDENT
SHOWS THAT § 1556 OF THE PPACA
MUST BE PRESERVED.

First, none of the defects in Randall or
Murphy are present in this case. If the individual
mandate were excised, § 1556 would stand after the
dust clears. The individual mandate is not closely
intertwined with § 1556 of the PPACA. Section 1556
makes two major changes to the Black Lung Benefits
Act. First, § 1556(a) reinstates the fifteen-year
rebuttable presumption that existed prior to the
1981 amendments to the BLBA. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 1556, 124 Stat. 260 (2010). Second, § 1556(b)
reinstates a continuation of survivor benefits
without requiring beneficiaries “to file a new claim
for benefits, or refile or otherwise revalidate the
claim of such miner.” See id. The last provision, §
1556(c), explains that these amendments apply to
any claim filed after January 1, 2005. See id. With
the exception of the last, these reinstated provisions
existed before the individual mandate and would
continue to function without it. Nothing in § 1556
would have to be substantially rewritten; it is
capable of functioning as intended.
Second, § 1556 is consistent with Congress’
intent and objectives in enacting the statute. The
broad purpose of the Affordable Care Act is reflected
in the original Senate and House of Representative
bills which ultimately were reconciled into the
Affordable Care Act. The preceding Senate HELP
Committee bill stated that the purpose of the bill
was to “make quality, affordable health care
available to all Americans, reduce costs, improve
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health care quality, enhance disease prevention, and
strengthen the health care workforce.” S. 1679,
111th Cong. (2009). Similarly, the House of
Representatives described the purpose of its bill to
“provide affordable, quality health care for all
Americans and reduce the growth in health care
spending, and for other purposes.” H.R. 3962, 111th
Cong. (2009). However, the clearest evidence of this
broad purpose can be found in the text of the
Affordable Care Act itself. The PPACA includes ten
titles ranging in subject matter from “Quality,
Affordable Health Care For All Americans,” to
“Transparency and Program Integrity” and “Health
Care Workforce,” and “Improving the Quality and
Efficiency of Health Care.” See Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 260 (2010). Within these titles, Congress
furthers its broad purposes by creating policy in a
myriad of ways such as: encouraging development of
new patient care models to increase quality of
healthcare, see id. §§ 3021-27, modernizing disease
prevention and public health, see id. §§ 4001-04,
providing new options for States to provide longterm services, see id. §§ 2401-06, and enhancing
health care education and training. See id. §§ 5301405.
The Black Lung Act amendments further the
broad purposes of the Affordable Care Act. The
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
see Pub. L. No. 91-173, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 743 (1969)
[hereinafter Mine Health and Safety Act], as further
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act, see Pub. L.
No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 794 (1972), recognized that
States had failed to provide adequate benefits to a
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significant number of miners and their surviving
dependents. See Mine Health and Safety Act § 2(a).
The text of the law states its broad purpose – to
protect the “health and safety of [the coal mining
industry’s] most precious resource – the miner.” See
id. The Country at this time faced an “urgent need to
provide more effective means . . . to prevent death
and serious physical harm, and . . . to prevent
occupational disease originating in such mines.” See
id. § 2(c). These problems were “a serious
impediment to the future growth of the coal mining
industry[,]” would “burden . . . commerce[,]” and
“cause grief and suffering to the miners and to their
families.” See id. § 2(b)-(d), (f). Congress’ policy was a
decision to place responsibility and liability on mine
operators “to prevent the existence of such conditions
and practices” in accordance with mandatory federal
requirements. See id. § 2(e), (g).
The § 1556 provisions amend Title IV within
the Mine Health and Safety Act requiring miner
operators to provide:
benefits, in cooperation with the States,
to coal miners who are totally disabled
due to pneumoconiosis and to the
surviving dependents of miners whose
death was due to such disease; and to
ensure that in the future adequate
benefits are provided to coal miners and
their dependents in the event of their
death or total disability due to
pneumoconiosis. Id. § 401.
This title serves the overall purpose of the
Mine Health and Safety Act by creating a strong
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incentive for employers to protect the workforce by
preventing injury and disease. See id. §2. By
restoring presumptions and administrative rules
which favor the miner or survivor, the Affordable
Care Act increased these existing regulatory
pressures, and did so for similar purposes. This
pressure shifts risk from individuals and onto
employers, who are better positioned to avoid
burdening the healthcare system with the costs of
caring for sick miners, who may eventually succumb
to black lung disease and leave a surviving
dependent behind. In short, the § 1556 amendments
are one example of a regulatory incentive added to
further the Affordable Care Act’s purposes. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 186 (stating that
where “Congress has included a series of provisions
operating as incentives to achieve that purpose, the
invalidation of one of the incentives should not
ordinarily cause Congress' overall intent to be
frustrated.”).
The complete absence of legislative intent to
the contrary solidifies this conclusion. In the only
legislative history on record on this provision,
Senator Byrd introduced § 1556 by remarking that:
While this bill as passed may not
satisfy the individual concerns of each
and every constituent or member of
Congress, it does begin to satisfy the
growing needs of millions of Americans
who find themselves without access to
the medical services and attention they
need. Access to proper health care for
every American citizen should not only
be held as a necessity, it should be
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considered the commensurate right of
any and every citizen of the mightiest
and most advanced Nation the world
has ever known. 156 Cong. Rec. S2083
(daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Byrd).
He then describes the amendments,
concluding that he looks “forward to working to
ensure that claimants get a fair shake as they try to
gain access to these benefits that have been so hard
won.” See id. at 2084. There is no record of
opposition to Senator Byrd’s remarks or the
amendment’s passage on any grounds. As a result,
the Court must retain § 1556 because it is without
constitutional defect, capable of functioning
independently from the individual mandate, and is
consistent with Congress’ objectives in enacting the
statute.
III.

EVEN ACCEPTING THE DISSENTING
VIEW IN Sebelius, THE PRESENT
CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A
CHALLENGE UNDER THAT TEST.

Even if the framework for analyzing
severability suggested by Justice Scalia in Sebelius
is accepted by the Court, the Court should still find §
1556 severable. Under Justice Scalia’s framework,
the Court would ask (1) whether the remaining
provision[s] operate in a manner consistent with the
intent of Congress, and (2) whether Congress would
have enacted the remaining provision[s] without the
unconstitutional portion. See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at
692-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia’s
dissent focuses on the second prong, and asks
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whether Congress only passed the various “omnibus”
provisions of the Affordable Care Act as a concession
for provisions such as the individual mandate. See
id.
Although a significant reform, § 1556 was not
“the price paid for support of a major provision” such
as the individual mandate. See id. at 704. The lack of
legislative history, or opposition to § 1556, first
demonstrates this. Second, Justice Scalia’s concern
that there is no “reliable basis for knowing” whether
a provision like § 1556 would have been passed on its
own can be disproved in this case. See id. at 705.
Section 1556 is different from several prior
unsuccessful attempts to amend similar parts of the
BLBA. See Black Lung Benefits Survivors Equity
Act, H.R. 228, 106th Cong. (Jan. 6, 1999)
(reinstating automatic survivor's benefits at 30
U.S.C. § 932(1)); S. 2685, 107th Cong. (June 26,
2002) (reinstating 30 U.S.C. § 932(1) and § 921(c)(4));
H.R. 4236, 107th Cong. (April 16, 2002) (same); H.R.
1988, 108th Cong. (May 6, 2003) (same); H.R. 300,
109th Cong. (Jan. 26, 2005) (same); H.R. 1123, 110th
Cong. (Feb. 16, 2007) (same); H.R. 1010, 111th Cong.
(Feb. 12, 2009) (same). However, § 1556 differs from
these past amendments by including subsection (c).
None of these earlier proposed bills contained
anything resembling § 1556(c), the retroactive
application of these amendments to claims filed after
January 1, 2005 and pending on or after March 23,
2010. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1556(c), 124 Stat. 260
(2010). This “[c]ongressional doubt concerning
judicial retroactivity doctrine . . . provide[s] a
plausible explanation” for Congress’s failure to enact
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the previous versions. See Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 261 (1994). It would thus be
improper to suggest that Congress would not have
passed § 1556 due to the failure of past bills which
did not address retroactivity.
Additionally, when the PPACA was passed,
the main obstacle to reaching a legislative bargain
was the public option. See Robert Pear & David M.
Herszenhorn, Senate Says Health Plan Will Cover
Another 31 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at
A1. Once Senator Reid introduced the Senate’s
initial health-care reform bill, which included a
public option, he faced resistance immediately from
fellow Democrats. See H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. § 1323
(Nov. 19, 2009) (unenacted version with public
option). After a month of opposition to the public
option, Senator Nelson (D-FL) asked: “How do we
bring it together so we can get the high threshold of
60 votes in the Senate?” See 155 Cong. Rec. S13078
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 2009). And thus, the Senate
leadership dropped the public option, and the
“legislative bargain” was struck. See David M.
Herszenhorn & David D. Kirkpatrick, Lieberman
Gets Ex-party to Shift on Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2009, at A1 (citing Senator Lieberman’s
opposition to, and subsequent drop of, the public
option as the impetus for passage in the Senate).
Instead of a public option, Congress implemented a
system modeling Massachusetts’ combination of
“insurance market regulations, a[n] [individual]
coverage mandate, and tax credits” to support
popular requirements such as guaranteed issue and
community rating provisions without causing an
economic “death spiral.” See King v. Burwell, 135 S.
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Ct. 2480, 2485-86 (2015). After agreeing that the
structure of the Affordable Care Act would improve
upon the existing model of healthcare rather than a
pure public option, new regulatory incentives
supporting and using the insurance model as a way
to implement broad healthcare reform goals could
begin. This is the likely reason why Senator Reid
exclaimed, “I don't know if there is a senator that
doesn't have something in this bill that was
important to them . . . .” See Sebelius, 567 U.S. at
704 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
This, in addition to the absence of evidence that §
1556 was contested or contingent upon the passage
of another provision, is decisive on the issue of
severability. Any other result would undermine the
principle that the votes cast by Congress’ members
are the ultimate proof of Congress’ intent. Careful
excision is necessary in order to preserve the will of
the legislative branch and the welfare of the people
it represents. The consequences of failing to adhere
to this rule are especially severe when the Court’s
ruling will revoke benefits that citizens have
received from Congress.
IV.

IF THE BYRD AMENDMENTS ARE
INSEVERABLE, THE COURT
SHOULD NOT APPLY ITS DECISION
RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE DOING
SO WOULD CAUSE INJUSTICE AND
HARDSHIP TO INDIVIDUALS WHO
HAVE RELIED ON THE BYRD
AMENDMENTS IN THEIR CASES.

Even if the Byrd amendments are not found to
be severable from the PPACA, the Court should only
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apply its decision prospectively. A retroactive
application would severely harm individuals who
have relied on the Byrd amendments, and would
impose substantial inequitable results in individual
cases. Constitutional remedies are generally limited
to the minimal remedy necessary to cure the
constitutional defect. See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S.
at 508-09 (2010).
A decision here that applies retroactively could
open the door to modification of past decisions in
black lung cases. According to the Department of
Labor’s regulation governing black lung claims, a
modification is granted when a litigant
“demonstrates a change in condition [or] a mistake
in a determination of fact.” 20 C.F.R. § 725.310.
These proceedings may be initiated by an employer
“any time prior to one year after the date of the last
payment of compensation.” 33 U.S.C. § 922. Thus, it
is possible that employers will assert that changes in
the Act brought about by the invalidation of the
Byrd amendments are changes in conditions
permitting a modification. See Peabody Coal Co. v.
Adler, 40 Fed. Appx. 54, 58-59 (6th Cir. 2002). Also,
employers may seek to relitigate cases under a
mistake of fact theory where the miner or spouse
received benefits based on the presumptions
contained in the Byrd amendments. If a court were
to accept these arguments, all claims that are
currently in pay status could be in jeopardy of facing
a modification claim. This would not only flood the
Department of Labor’s already-overburdened system
with re-opened claims, but it would work a
substantial injustice on miners and surviving
spouses. Miners and surviving spouses could find
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themselves having to once again spend years
litigating claims they have already won. Further, if
they lost, employers or the Department of Labor
could pursue miners and surviving spouses for the
pay they had already received. This would work a
substantial injustice upon the very people the Black
Lung Benefits Act is intended to protect.
The Court has historically rejected retroactive
application of its decisions when doing so would
impair important government programs. See
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 88 (1982) (finding that
retroactive application in a case of first impression
was not necessary to the holding and “would surely
visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those
litigants who relied upon the Act’s vesting of
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts.”). In the
context of the black lung benefits program, a
retroactive application of the law would severely
impair the program. Retroactive application would
increase the burden on already-overburdened
Department of Labor dockets. This harm to the
program would substantially delay and interrupt
access to benefits for thousands of former coal
miners and their widows whose claims and
livelihood rely on black lung decisions. Rather, the
Court should consider a prospective application of its
holding as it has done in the past. Whether a
decision should apply prospectively in civil cases has
traditionally been governed by the nonretroactivity
test articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404
U.S. 97, 106 (1971). According to that test, the Court
may apply a decision non-retroactively when the
issue is of first impression and where the holding
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might be unfair or cause harm to individual parties
if applied retroactively. See id. at 106-07.
Additionally, this Court has held that “[w]here a
decision of this Court could produce substantial
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is
ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or
hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
The Court should apply this approach in the
current situation, if it finds that severability is not
an appropriate remedy. Further, the Court should
specify that its holding does not apply retroactively.
This is both to avoid worsening the backlog of cases
within the Department of Labor, and to avoid
injuries to disabled miners, surviving spouses and
other dependents of deceased coal miners, many of
whom depend on the payment of benefits to afford
their basic necessities.
CONCLUSION
It must be presumed that § 1556 should be
severed from the Affordable Care Act if the
individual mandate is struck. The provision is
constitutionally valid, functions independently of the
individual mandate, is consistent with Congress’
objectives, and is untainted by evidence that the
legislature would prefer no Act at all to an Act
severed. Further, even if dissenting views on the test
for severability are adopted, § 1556 should be
preserved. The passage of § 1556 was not a
concession that Congress made for the individual
mandate. The individual mandate and insurancebased implementation model was the compromise for
the contested public option, not the remaining
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Affordable Care Act initiatives. There is no
opposition in the record to § 1556. Further, these
amendments were altered from previously
unsuccessful proposals by adopting a new
retroactivity provision which allowed them to pass.
Given the weight of precedent and the lack of
contrary legislative intent, the Court must preserve
the will of Congress. The consequences of striking §
1556, as with many other provisions of the
Affordable Care Act, are widespread and dramatic.
The Court must tread carefully to avoid stifling the
voice of the people, expressed through their
legislators, and manifested in the passage of this
Act.
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